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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CPLR 3025(b) contains no limitation on the scope of an
amendment of a pleading with court leave."-. Cases under the
CPA were generally liberal in the types of amendments permitted,-
2
even to the extent of allowing the addition or substitution of an
entirely new cause of action, changes in the legal theory of the
action, or even adding new defenses or counterclaims.- 3 However,
under CPLR 3025 (b), the requirement that leave to amend a plead-
ing be freely given does not preclude the court from exercising its
discretion and denying a motion to amend an answer. In Ciccone
v. Glenwood Holding Corp.,114 defendant's motion to amend his
answer so that he could allege that the plaintiff was his employee
was denied because plaintiff's right to workmen's compensation was
lost by that law's statute of limitations.
The decision in Stillwell is well in accord with past cases,
and reveals that under the CPLR, the freedom to amend the
pleadings, while broadly given in the statute, is still restrained by
the discretion of the court. As the court stated: "the branch of
the motion for leave to amend would ordinarily be granted as a
matter of course unless plaintiffs could show that they would be
prejudiced in some way by the granting of such a motion." '" 5
The inability of a plaintiff to prosecute the action if defendant's mo-
tion is granted surely constitutes such prejudice."16
CPLR 3041: Bills of particulars and the burden of proof.
In Jansens Bottled Gas Serv., Inc. v. Warren Petro. Corp.,11T
plaintiff sued for damages for breach of warranty arising from de-
fendant's sale of a quantity of -propane gas. The defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint for failure to diligently prosecute the
"'-CPLR 3025(b) provides, in part: "a party may amend his plea lings
* . . at any time by leave, of court or by stipulation of all parties. Leave
shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just including the granting
of costs and continuances.Y- For a discussion of what constitutes "such
terms as may be just," see 3 WEINSTEI, KomN & MU.LER, NEW Yoi CIvI.
PRActiCE ff3025.21 (1965).
11 For a good discussion of the many problems involved in the distinction
between the terms "amendment" and "supplement" under the previous law
(CPA § 245), see Ponticello v. Prudential Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 549,
121 N.Y.S.2d 305 (4th Dep't 1953).
113 See Renwick v. Town of Allegany, 18 App. Div. 2d 877, 236 N.Y.S2d
902 (4th Dep't 1963); 1936 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 48, 2 N.Y. JurD. CouNcIL
REP. 15; PRAsHaEa & TRAPANi, NEW YORK PRAcricE 416-18 (4th ed.
1959). See generally PETEPFREUND & McLAuGHLIN, NEW YoRK PRACrlCE
754 n.3 (1964).
11444 Misc. 2d 273, 253 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y. City Civil Ct. 1964).
"-1 Stilwell v. Giant Supply Corp., 47 Misc. 2d 568, 569-70, 262 N.Y.S.2d
833, 835 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
1167B McKiNxy's CPLR 3025, supp. commentary 123-24 (1965).
11 47 Misc. 2d 461, 262 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1965).
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action pursuant to CPLR 3216, and for summary judgment
under CPLR 3212. The court refused to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to diligently prosecute the action, but de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. The
court noted that the motion for summary judgment was "inex-
tricably interwoven" with a cross-motion interposed by the plaintiff
which sought relief from a preclusion order for failure to provide a
bill of particulars. It was also observed that "if relief is granted
from the preclusion order, factual questions exist and are of such
substance as to defeat the motion for summary judgment."""
Because of the judicial tendency to impose serious consequences
upon plaintiffs who ignore demands for bills of particulars and
the orders affecting them,"19 the court found itself "troubled in
attempting to determine what rule should be applied. .. for failure
to comply with a conditional preclusion order."' 20 In following
what was said to be the rule in the third department, the court
recognized that its conclusion was not based upon an exercise of
discretion. Unless a plaintiff shows in factual detail an excuse
proportionate to the neglect, the order of preclusion will not be
vacated.'2 1  Since the court was not able to find any "exceptional
factual situation and circumstances that would permit relief,"'2 2 the
cross-motion for relief from the preclusion order was denied.
Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted
on the merits and without costs.
A disturbing aspect of the Jansen holding deals with the
question of the burden of proof. It is well settled that the party
who makes a material affirmation which is denied by the pleadings
bears the burden of proof with respect to that issue. This burden
of proof never shifts, but remains where the pleadings originally
placed it, although the burden of going forward with the evidence may
shift from time to time.2 3
To prove his cause in a civil action, the plaintiff must make
out his case by a preponderance of the evidence. The demand for
11s Id. at 462, 262 N.Y.S2d at 770.
"19 Mensh v. 12 Beekman Place, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 642, 201 N.Y.S.2d
286 (1st Dep't 1960); see Lehman v. Johnson, Drake & Piper of Vietnam,
Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 913, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (3d Dep't 1963); Baumgarten
v. Bratt, 13 App. Div. 2d 832, 216 N.Y.S.2d 386 (2d Dep't 1961).120 Jansen's Bottled Gas Serv., Inc. v. Warren Petro. Corp., 47 Misc. 2d
461, 462, 262 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1965).
121 Paris v. Poticha, 1 App. Div. 2d 277, 149 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dep't
1956); see also Lang v. Nev York Cent. R, 4 App. Div. 2d 926, 166
N.Y.S.2d 804 (4th Dep't 1957); Goldstein v. Wickett, 3 App. Div. 2d
135, 158 N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th Dep't 1957).
'
2 2Jansen's Bottled Gas Serv., Inc. v. Warren Petro. Corp., supra note
120, at 463, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 770; see also Lang v. New York Cent. R.R.,
supra note 121.
'
2 3 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Siefke, 144 N.Y. 354, 39 N.E. 358
(1895); see generally RcHmwsox, EvIDEcNE §§ 95-101 (Prince ed. 1964).
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a bill of particulars is a helpful procedural device to permit neces-
sary facts to come to light before trial.124  In Jansen, by denying
plaintiff's motion for relief from the preclusion order, the court
effectively prevented him from sustaining the burden of proof
with respect to his cause of action. The court's decision, precluding
the plaintiff from introducing at the trial evidence that should have
been contained in the bill of particulars which he failed to serve,
may have rendered the plaintiff powerless to present facts which
might have been vitally necessary to sustain his cause of action. 5
Although it might reasonably be argued that the plaintiff placed
himself in this unenviable position by failing to comply with the
demand for a bill of particulars, it seems that the granting of
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the merits wrought
an excessively mechanical and stringent result. Though it may
be technically true that summary judgment should be granted where,
as a matter of law, a plaintiff is unable to sustain his cause of
action,'126 the mere failure to provide a bill of particulars does not
seem to be a sufficiently significant "matter of law" to entitle a
defendant to a verdict notwithstanding the merits of his case. It is
difficult to see how the granting of the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the merits could be warranted by a refusal
to particularize the allegations on the part of the plaintiff.
Aside from the question of the burden of proof, there is
another method by which a court could utilize the CPLR to deprive
a plaintiff of his right to judgment where he has failed to serve
a properly demanded bill of particulars. The failure of a plaintiff
to adhere to the requirement of serving a properly demanded bill
of particulars is tantamount to his failure to diligently proceed with
the prosecution of his cause of action. As such, there seems to be
no logical reason why a defendant's motion to dismiss for neglect
to prosecute under CPLR 3216 should not be granted. The basic
merit or lack of merit of a plaintiff's claim should logically play
no part in a dismissal for neglect to prosecute. 2 7  This dismissal
would be on the merits, as in the instant case, if the court so
specified.128  It would seem much wiser to dismiss a plaintiff's cause
of action for his neglect, rather than awarding a judgment to the
defendant. If a delay is without merit or excuse, dismissal on
124 CPLR 3041 provides that "any party may require any other party to
give a bill of particulars of his claim, or a copy of the items of the account
alleged in a pleading."
125 See Dwyer v. Slattery, 118 App. Div. 345, 346, 103 N.Y. Supp. 433,
434 (1st Dep't 1907) ; Steinleger v. Frankel, 117 Misc. 693, 695-96, 192 N.Y.
Supp. 74, 76 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1922); PrETREUNzD & McLAUGHI.IN,
NEw YoRx PRACTICE 1008 n.2 (1964).
126 See CPLR 3212 (motion for summary judgment).
127 7B McKINMNE's CPLR 3012, supp. commentary 49-51 (1965).
128 CPLR 3216 provides that a dismissal for neglect to prosecute is not
on the merits unless the court order so specifies.
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the merits does not seem inequitable. But, to award summary
judgment on the merits to a defendant without a full examination
and evaluation of the total concept of the burden of proof, at least
on a theoretical basis, seems to be unsound. If the bill of particulars
did request facts, the proof of which struck at the heart of plaintiff's
cause of action, his practical inability under the order of preclusion
to present such proof would be, in effect, granting a defendant
summary judgment. The question still remains: Should a defend-
ant prevail at judgment regardless of his ability, or inability, to
counter a meritorious allegation which plaintiff is procedurally
unable to prove?
ARTICLE 31 - DlsCLOSURE
CPLR 3101: Disclosure against the state in other than
the Court of Claims.
Under prior law, the state was able to obtain disclosure against
an adversary regardless of where the action was pending, whereas
disclosure was obtainable against the state only in the Court of
Claims. In State v. Master Plumbers Ass'n,12 9 after asserting
defenses to the state's action, defendants served notices for an EBT
and for discovery and inspection of various documents, which
notices the state sought to vacate. The issue was whether the state
was subject to all the disclosure provisions of Article 31. The
court stated that there was no logical reason for not allowing
disclosure against the state to the same extent that it is available
to the state against any other party.
It is surprising, however, that in drawing such a close analogy
between disclosure in the Court of Claims and in other courts, the
court failed to require that, in the latter case, disclosure be obtain-
able only by court order. This would be appropriate, since CPLR
3102(f) (which treats disclosure in the Court of Claims) requires
such a court order.
Prior to the decision in the instant case, a contrary result
was reached in State v. Boar's Head Provisions Co.,130 which
disallowed disclosure against the state in a court other than the
Court of Claims. The court reasoned that since prior law had
been construed as forbidding such disclosure, and since the CPLR
made no express change in those prior provisions, disclosure should
be disallowed in a supreme court action. The court in the instant
case failed to cite the Boar's Head case-probably because it had
not yet been reported. The preceding illustrates that by no means
129 47 Misc. 2d 187, 262 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1965).
18046 Misc. 2d 759, 260 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1965).
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